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1. Introduction
Current digital mobile networks, e.g. those based on the ETSI GSM standards, provide a robust set of
security facilities to protect communications across the air interface.  The main GSM security services
are confidentiality of user and signalling data (across the air interface), user authentication to a base
station, and user identity confidentiality (across the air interface).  Because of their universal nature
and the extra requirements of high data rate multimedia traffic, standards for future networks will need
to support a larger range of security services.  Possible new services include:  end-to-end data
confidentiality and integrity, incontestable charging, and a more robust user identity confidentiality.
There is also much to be gained by standardising management aspects of security provision.  In GSM,
although the management security requirements are clear, the exact way in which user key information
is generated, stored and accessed is left to Network Operators (NOs) and equipment providers to
arrange.  This can make security service provision costly for all concerned, since every NO may
arrange security management differently.  In future mobile networks, possibly operating in a rather
more deregulated environment than at present, standardised support for security management will be a
very important feature.  Without such standards, the required co-operation between the likely large
numbers of competing NOs and Service Providers (SPs) could become impossibly complex to arrange.
In this paper we examine some of the security provisions in the emerging ETSI UMTS (Universal
Mobile Telecommunications System) and ITU FPLMTS (Future Public Land Mobile
Telecommunications System) standards for future mobile telecommunications networks.  After a brief
review of some of the most significant areas for the provision of security services, we focus our
attention on the simultaneous provision of identity and location privacy for the mobile user and mutual
authentication between mobile user and base station.  In doing so we describe research into security for
future mobile networks performed by the DTI/EPSRC-funded project ‘Third Generation System
Security Studies’ (3GS3), part of the LINK Personal Communications Programme.  The project
collaborators were Vodafone Ltd, GPT Ltd. and Royal Holloway, University of London.  The authors
would like to acknowledge the invaluable support and advice of colleagues in 3GS3, without which
this paper could not have been written.
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22. Third-generation mobile systems
The term 3rd generation refers to mobile systems which will follow existing digital networks such as
GSM, DCS1800 and DECT; such systems are currently being standardised by ITU (FPLMTS) and
ETSI (UMTS).  They are characterised by the following:  multiple operators, multiple environments
(residential cordless, mobile, satellite, etc.), multi-vendor and standardised interfaces, use of the
WARC-assigned FPLMTS band, higher bit-rates (up to 2Mb/s), and migration from existing systems.
Current GSM systems support security features such as confidentiality of user and signalling data on
the air interface, authentication of users, and user identity confidentiality.  There are areas where
security can be enhanced in 3rd generation systems, partly based on lessons from 2nd generation
systems, but mostly deriving from the new characteristics noted above.
In our discussion of security in mobile communications we use a simple model with four roles:  Users,
NOs, SPs and Intruders, which are defined fully in Clause 3.2 of [1].  Briefly:
• a user is an entity authorised to use particular network services,
• a Network Operator (NO) is an entity providing network capabilities to support particular services,
and which allows users to access the network to use the services,
• a Service Provider (SP) is an entity responsible for the provision of particular services, and will
typically do so by means of contractual relationships with NOs, and
• an intruder is an entity that abuses the network infrastructure or services on the network.
3. Security features for future networks
Initial studies in 3GS3 identified the likely security threats to future mobile networks in the context of
role and functional models (also defined by the project; see [1]).  Security features necessary to address
these threats were identified and classified, including the following.
• Entity authentication.  Entity authentication between a user and Network Operators and/or Service
Providers was studied.  A number of mechanisms, based on various cryptographic methods, were
examined, classified, and tested (formally and informally).  As a result, an entity authentication
mechanism was proposed to both UMTS and FPLMTS, and subsequently was incorporated into
both sets of draft standards.  This mechanism, briefly described in [2], is considered in Section 5.1;
a further mechanism is considered in Section 5.2.  Problems arising when some of the
‘authentication servers’ within a system may be unreliable, [3,4], and the effect of the properties of
the underlying components of an authentication mechanism on its design, [2], were also considered.
3• Novel techniques for key distribution.  Maurer has shown, [5], how Wyner’s ‘Wire tap channel’
concept, [6], can be used much more widely than originally envisaged.  The idea makes use of the
universal presence of noise in communications channels to help two users agree a secret key using
only ‘public’ channels.  The practicality of this idea was investigated, and new theoretical results
were discovered, [7].
• End-to-end encipherment, and warranted interception facilities.  Multi-media terminals will place
demanding bandwidth requirements on the mobile network.  These requirements have relatively
little direct effect on security feature provision, except that any directly data-related security
features, such as the provision of data confidentiality, must be implemented using methods which
can handle high-bandwidth data.  In practice this means that air interface encryption methods must
be able to handle high throughput rates.  However, this should not be too difficult since multi-media
terminals will not be low cost items, and the provision of processing capabilities to handle high
data-rate encipherment should not add significantly to the overall cost of such devices.
 More significant to the design of security features are the likely needs of users of these multi-media
services; these needs are potentially very different from those of ‘voice’ users of existing networks.
Of particular importance are likely to be issues such as end-to-end integrity and confidentiality,
albeit that existing networks do not support integrity, and only provide encryption for the air
interface.  Of all the end-to-end security features, end-to-end confidentiality raises most problems.
The problems are mainly political rather than technical, and arise from the need of law enforcement
agencies for access to certain communications paths, when a warrant exists.  Such access is
valuable in combating criminal activity, but also needs to be carefully controlled because of the
civil liberties issues.  This issue has given rise to a public debate on ‘key escrow’ schemes, starting
with the US Clipper scheme; see, for example [8].  There is a growing consensus that ‘Trusted
Third Parties’ (TTPs) offer a means of supporting warranted access at the same time as meeting
legitimate user needs for confidentiality.  3GS3 has developed a TTP-based scheme for warranted
access, offering considerable advantages over some other proposed schemes, [9].
• Identity and location privacy. In mobile telecommunications systems, each user must let its SP
know where he/she is so that its call route can be maintained by the system.  This is achieved by the
registration and location update mechanisms which a user employs to tell its current location to its
SP via the NO for the current location area.  This has the side effect that anyone wanting to track
this particular user can do so by monitoring the identity and location messages transmitted during
the registration and location update processes.
 Users of public telecommunications networks are likely to regard the possibility of their location
being revealed by these mechanisms as an unacceptable breach of personal privacy.  Thus, in order
4to prevent users’ identity and location information being disclosed to unauthorised parties, an
Identity and Location Privacy (ILP) mechanism is needed; such a mechanism protects users against
tracing of their physical location by illegal means.
 Current GSM networks provide a level of user identity confidentiality, but the mechanism used is
less appropriate for future networks, not least because of the multi-operator environment likely to
prevail.  New mechanisms, based on both public key and ‘conventional’ cryptographic techniques,
have been examined, and are the focus of the remainder of this paper.
• Simultaneous multiple access channel coding and encipherment.  The claim that CDMA, a likely
multiple access method for future mobile networks, is inherently secure was considered and
rejected.  Options for using CDMA sequences for encipherment were also examined, [10].
• Terminal-related security.  Current networks enable black-listing of stolen terminals, and detection
of non-type-approved terminals.  The need for such facilities in future was reviewed, given that
most mobile terminals are likely to be relatively low-cost.  Whether a universal scheme is adopted,
or a scheme only applying to valuable (e.g. multimedia) terminals, remains a topic for debate.
A predominant feature on the work of 3GS3 was its commitment to standards contributions, both in
ETSI and in ITU.  Apart from mechanisms proposed and adopted, much of the draft standards’ text on
security features classification and analysis is based on 3GS3 contributions.
4. Identity and Location Privacy
The remainder of this paper is concerned with two particularly important security services for future
mobile multimedia networks:  Identity and Location Privacy (ILP) for the mobile user, and mutual
authentication between mobile user and base station.  We start by considering in detail the provision of
ILP services.  Subsequently we consider two mutual authentication mechanisms also providing ILP.
4.1. The GSM approach
In GSM, ILP is achieved by using Temporary Identities (TIs) over the air interface instead of Real
Identities (RIs)2.  The TI is chosen by an NO3 and is valid only in a given location area.  The SP4
maintains a database of current TI/RI relationships and can therefore determine the real identity of a
user, i.e. it can determine the RI from the TI.  TIs are changed on each location update and on certain
other network-defined occasions.
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5In more detail, the user identifies himself by sending the old TI during each location update process
(this occurs prior to authentication, and the TI must therefore be sent unencrypted).  The new TI is
returned after authentication is complete and a new session key has been generated, and hence the new
TI can be, and is, encrypted when sent to the user.  This prevents an interceptor from linking an one TI
to the next, and blocks tracing of user movements by linking TIs.  If a TI is unavailable or invalid, e.g.
if during the initial location registration the old NO is unreachable or the old TI is unknown, [11], then
a user has to identify itself using its RI.  In this event a new TI is allocated and returned encrypted.
4.2. Possible threats to the GSM approach
In this section we consider seven possible threats to the GSM ILP scheme.
T1. Intercepting communications between user and NO.  An intruder can obtain a RI from the
GSM air interface whenever a RI is sent in clear text, i.e. in the following cases:  initial location
registration, ‘old visitor location register unreachable’, and ‘no old TI available’.
T2. Impersonating a user.  In a mobile telecommunications environment an intruder may be able to
fabricate and/or interfere with a user’s messages to an NO.  An intruder could modify the user’s
TI and/or the Location Area Identifier, both of which are sent from user to NO in clear text.  This
will mean that the NO fails to recognise the user (or is unable to contact the ‘old’ NO), causing
the NO to ask the user to send its RI unencrypted over the Air Interface.  Such a procedure could
be repeated, enabling an intruder to track a user.
T3. Impersonating an NO.  In GSM, user authentication is unilateral, i.e. the NO verifies the user’s
identity, but the user does not verify the NO’s identity.  Hence an intruder could impersonate an
NO and instruct a user to send its RI unencrypted over the Air Interface.  As is the case for threat
T2, such a procedure could be repeated as often as required, enabling an intruder to track a user.
T4. Intercepting channels between NOs and SPs.  If an intruder could monitor the channel between
NO and SP, it could observe a user’s identity and location information, and hence track a user,
because each updated location message is sent from an NO to an SP, possibly in clear text.
T5. Malicious NOs.  It is possible for a malicious NO to track a user because TIs are chosen by NOs,
and hence NOs have access to a user’s RI.
T6. Impersonating an SP to an NO.  In GSM the SP verifies the user’s identity during the user
authentication process, but no mechanisms are provided for the NO and/or the user to verify the
SP’s identity.  In practice where such a threat exists proprietary techniques are used to protect
SP/NO communications, and hence (indirectly) protect the user against an intruder impersonating
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6an SP.  However, if the NO does not authenticate the SP, then an intruder could impersonate an
SP to an NO to obtain the user’s identity and location information (and thereby track the user).
T7. Malicious SPs.  A user’s physical location could be disclosed to an intruder if an SP abuses the
user’s identity and location information.  However, it is essential that the SP knows the user’s
identity and location since the user has a contractual/charging relationship with its SP.  Hence SPs
will need to protect their users against breaches of privacy, and utilise secure access control and
audit mechanisms for their user databases.
4.3. Requirements for an ILP mechanism
We now list general requirements for ILP mechanisms, based on our analysis of GSM.
• The user’s RI should never be transmitted unprotected across the air interface (hence addressing
threats T1, T2 and T3).
• The user’s RI should never be transmitted unprotected between network entities (NOs and/or SPs),
unless the comms. path is inherently secure (hence addressing threat T4).
• The user’s RI should only be given to parties needing it for correct network operation; in the limit
this could mean that the user’s SP is the only entity knowing the user’s RI (addressing threat T5).
For service provision, only the user’s SP needs to know the user’s RI, since when an NO provides
service to a user it only needs to know the user’s TI and who the user’s SP is, so that the NO can
subsequently charge the SP for service provided to the user (the SP will also need to keep the TI so
that the charge can be matched against the user’s RI).
• Third parties should be unable to track users by impersonating an SP to an NO, an NO to a user, a
user to an NO, or an NO to an SP (hence addressing threats T2, T3 and T6).
Not all these requirements can always be met in a practical system, although at least the first
requirement should always be met (unlike in GSM).
4.4. General approaches for providing ILP
We now discuss two general approaches for providing ILP, which typically occurs in combination with
entity authentication.  Section 5 contains examples of the two approaches.
The fundamental problem is to meet the first identified requirement, i.e. to avoid transmission of
users’ RIs on the air interface.  Note that the reason why addresses of some kind need to be sent across
the air interface is because it is a broadcast medium; NOs need to have a means of distinguishing
between users, and users need to have a way of deciding which communications are meant for them.
7In the first approach, where symmetric encipherment is used, addresses cannot be enciphered.  This is
because the NO needs to know which key to use to decipher an address, i.e. the NO needs to read the
address before deciphering it.  Similarly, a user needs to read an address embedded in an enciphered
data string before deciding whether it should attempt to decipher it.  Of course, these problems
disappear if all entities use the same key, but this is very insecure and we do not consider this approach
further here.  This has led to the use of temporary identities (as in GSM) where the RI is not used as an
address, and instead a ‘temporary’ address (TI) is used to identify a user, and this TI changes at regular
intervals.  The new TI is chosen by the NO and sent to the user in enciphered form, thus preventing an
intruder from linking old TIs to new ones.  The problem with the GSM approach is the need to use the
user’s RI prior to setting up an initial TI; this problem can be avoided by using two levels of TIs, as in
the approach of Section 5.1.  Apart from this example, another scheme using TIs has been proposed by
Mu and Varadharajan, [12], who refer to subliminal identities instead of TIs.
In the second approach, where asymmetric encipherment is used, it is possible to encipher addresses, at
least on the ‘up link’, i.e. in communications between mobile users and an NO.  This is because users
can encipher data sent to the NO using the NO’s public encipherment key.  Protecting the ‘down link’
is rather more problematic, and still requires the use of some form of TI.  However the ‘set up’
problems associated with GSM can probably be avoided by using this approach.  The only remaining
problem is to ensure that a user knows which NO it is sending to (and hence can use the right public
key), and possesses reliable copies of public encipherment keys for all NOs it may wish to use.  An
example of such a scheme is given in section 5.2; another scheme of this type is in section 9.4 of [13].
In addition, Beller et al., [14], give one symmetric based and three asymmetric based authentication
protocols for use in mobile systems.  Whilst the symmetric based mechanism does not provide ILP
services, the asymmetric based protocols provide a level of ILP by encrypting the user identity using
the public key of an entity roughly corresponding to our NO, thus ensuring that only the NO knows the
user’s true identity.  Carsen, [15], proposed some enhancements to the protocols in [14], although the
ILP mechanisms remain the same.  Federrath et al., [16], proposed an ILP scheme for mobile systems
which prevents a user’s SP from tracking a user’s movements, and Jackson, [17], in the same
proceedings, proposed a very similar scheme to prevent ‘management’ from spying on users.  In these
schemes, a mobile user needs to have know the entire route from himself to his SP (consisting of a
number of NOs), all these NOs’ public keys, and also has to compute asymmetric encryptions several
times (one for each NO in the route) during every location update process. These requirements are
probably unrealistic for the real mobile user with limited computational power and memory.
84.5. Legal and operational limitations on ILP
In the discussion of ILP requirements in section 4.3, we ignored the domain management requirements
applying to NOs.  There are two issues, applying in some domains, affecting the provision of ILP.
• The Calling Line Identifier (CLI) requirement necessitates that called entities are provided with the
CLI (which typically means the telephone number) of the party calling them.
• The Warranted Interception requirement means that law enforcement agencies must be given
access to certain calls starting or terminating within their domain, typically when an interception
warrant has been issued.  In principle this requirement could also be applied to all calls routed
through a domain, even if they do not start or terminate within that domain, although this is unlikely
(see [8]).  For details of evolving European rules see [18].
This means that some NOs may need to know the RIs of users sending and/or receiving calls within
their network.  However, this does not mean it is essential for the ILP scheme used to always transfer a
user’s RI to an NO.  It may be more appropriate to have RIs routinely transferred from SPs to NOs
only when NOs need them for legal and/or operational reasons.  Thus one could envisage a situation
where some NOs will (by law) not provide service to a user unless the user’s SP is prepared to provide
the user’s RI to the NO, whilst some users may be so concerned about privacy that they refuse to use
their mobile telephone in networks where their RI has to be divulged.  Hence, if the ILP mechanism
can avoid the need for the user’s RI to be distributed outside the SP, a whole range of privacy options
become possible, giving both users and government agencies the maximum flexibility to manage ILP.
5. Mechanisms for mutual authentication providing ILP
In GSM networks it is theoretically possible for an intruder to masquerade as an NO by imitating a
base station, as GSM only provides unilateral authentication of a user to an NO.  For GSM it is hard to
see how the intruder could gain much from doing this; however, in 3rd generation systems it is likely
that NOs will have much more over-the-air control of users.  For instance, they may be able to disable
faulty terminals directly, or write billing data direct to the UIM (User Identity Module, the UMTS
equivalent of a Subscriber Identity Module or SIM).  Thus mutual (two-way) entity authentication is
necessary.
In both mechanisms described, the NO is not automatically given the user’s RI; if required for legal or
operational reasons, the RI can be sent from SP to NO in addition to the specified information.  Also in
both mechanisms the SP acts as a TTP to help provide authentication and key establishment.
95.1. A mechanism based on symmetric cryptography
5.1.1. Background
This mechanism was previously outlined in [2].  It has the advantage that it establishes a temporary
user-NO key, i.e. there is no need for NO-SP communication once a user has registered with an NO.
This contrasts with the GSM scheme, which needs regular NO-SP communications to transfer
challenge-response pairs.  It combines the provision of ILP, entity authentication and session key
generation in a single mechanism, and also conforms to the relevant ISO/IEC standard, [19].
The mechanism provides the following security features:
1. Mutual entity authentication between user and NO.
2. User identity confidentiality over the communications path between user and NO.
3. Session key establishment between user and NO for use in providing other security features, e.g. for
confidentiality and/or integrity for data passed between user and NO.
The mechanism makes use of the following types of cryptographic key:
• user - SP key: KSU, a secret key known only to a user and its SP, and which remains fixed for long
periods of time.
• user - NO key: KNU, a secret key known only to a user, its SP and its ‘current’ NO.  These keys may
remain fixed while a user is registered with an NO.  Associated with every such key is a Key Offset
(KO), which is used in conjunction with the user - SP key KSU to generate KNU.
• session key: KS, a secret key known only to a user and its current NO, i.e. the NO with whom the
user is registered.  A new session key, for use in data encipherment and/or other security features, is
generated as a result of every use of the authentication mechanism.
The mechanism makes use of the following cryptographic algorithms:
• user authentication algorithm: AU, which takes as input a secret key and data string and outputs a
check value RES.
• SP authentication algorithm: AS, which takes as input a secret key and data string and outputs a
check value RES.  This algorithm may be the same as AU.
• identity hiding algorithm: CU, which takes as input a secret key and data string and outputs a string
CIPH used to conceal a user identity.
• session key generation algorithm: AK, which takes as input a secret key and data string and outputs a
session key KS
.
• user - NO key generation algorithm: AN, which takes as input a secret key and data string and
outputs a user - NO secret key KNU.  This algorithm may be the same as AK.
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The mechanism makes use of the following types of temporary identifiers:
• temporary user identity for NO: TIN, an identity used to identify a user to the NO with which they
are currently registered.  It is known to the user and the current NO.
• temporary user identity for SP: TIS, an identity is used to identify a user to its SP.  It is known to the
user and its SP.
There are two versions of the mechanism, depending on whether or not the user is currently registered
with the NO; we consider them separately, although they are closely related.  In the description, as
throughout, X||Y denotes the concatenation of data items X and Y.
5.1.2. Current registrations
We first consider the case where the user is already registered with the NO, so that the user and NO
share a valid temporary identity TIN and secret key KNU.  The mechanism for this case consists of three
messages exchanged between user and NO (the SP is not involved):
1. user → NO:  TIN,  RNDU
2. NO → user:  RNDN,  TI′N⊕CIPHN,  RESN
3. user → NO:  RESU
RNDU and RNDN are random ‘challenges’ generated by user and NO respectively.  RESU and RESN are
‘challenge responses’ generated by user and NO respectively, where RESN = AU(KNU,
RNDN||RNDU||TI′N), and RESU = AU(KNU, RNDU||RNDN).  TI′N is the ‘new’ user TI for use with the NO,
and will replace the current value TIN.  CIPHN  is a string of bits used to conceal TI′N whilst in transit
between NO and user, where CIPHN = CU(KNU, RNDU).  The user and NO can compute a session key
KS as KS = AK(KNU, RNDU||RNDN||TI′N).
5.1.3. New registrations
We second consider the case where the user is not registered with the NO, and so user and NO do not
share any information.  The mechanism for this case consists of five messages exchanged between
user, NO, and the user’s SP.
1. user  → NO:  TIS,  RNDU
2. NO → SP:  TIS,  RNDU
3. SP → NO:  TI′S⊕CIPHS,  KO,  KNU,  RESS
4. NO → user:  TI′S⊕CIPHS,  KO,  RESS,  RNDN,  TI′N⊕CIPHN,  RESN
5. user → NO:  RESU
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First note that we assume that a secure channel is available for exchanging messages 2 and 3 between
NO and SP.  As previously, RNDU and RNDN are random ‘challenges’ generated by user and NO
respectively, and RESU, RESN, and RESS are ‘challenge responses’ generated by user, NO, and SP
respectively.  RESN and RESU are calculated as in Section 5.1.2, and RESS = AS(KSU, RNDU||KO|| TI′S).
TI′S is the ‘new’ user TI for use with the SP, and will replace the current value TIS.  As previously, TI′N
is the ‘new’ user TI for use with the NO.  CIPHS is a string of bits used to conceal TI′S whilst in transit
between SP and user, where CIPHS = CU(KSU, RNDU).  CIPHN (computed as previously) is a bit-string
used to conceal the new TI TI′N whilst in transit between NO and user.  On receipt of message 4, the
user can compute the NO secret key KNU = AN(KSU, KO||NOID), where NOID is the NO’s identifier;
the same calculation is done by the SP on receipt of message 2.  As previously, user and NO can
compute session key KS = AK(KNU, RNDU||RNDN||TI′N).  As a result of the mechanism, user and NO
will share a secret key KNU and a TI TI′N.
5.2. A mechanism based on asymmetric cryptography
5.2.1. Requirements
This mechanism is based on a combination of public key encipherment and symmetric cryptographic
techniques.  Nonces are used for checking timeliness.  The following cryptographic functions are used.
• A public key encipherment function E (which the user and SP must implement).  We use EK+[X] to
denote public key encipherment of data X using public encipherment key K+.
• A cryptographic check function f (which the user, NO and SP must implement).  We use fK(X) to
denote the (check-value) output of f given input data X and key K.
• A symmetric encipherment function e (which user, NO and SP must implement).  We use eK(X) to
denote the output of e given input data X and key K.  This encipherment algorithm must provide
integrity and origin authentication (c.f. requirements (a), (b) in Clause 4 of ISO/IEC 11770-2, [20]).
If necessary, the encipherment algorithms used by the two pairs: user/SP, and NO/SP, can be
distinct; we have assumed that a single algorithm is used to simplify the presentation.
The following keys need to be in place:
• The SP needs to generate a public key/private key pair for the public key encipherment algorithm.
The user must have a reliable copy of the SP’s public encipherment key, KS+.
• The user and SP must share a secret key K'US for the cryptographic check function f.
• The two entity pairs: user/SP, and NO/SP, both need to share a secret key for the symmetric
encipherment algorithm, denoted by KUS and KNS respectively.
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In addition the user, NO and SP must be able to generate non-repeating nonces, the user must be able
to generate temporary identities, and the SP must be able to generate session keys.
5.2.2. The protocol
The following protocol (partly) conforms to Key Establishment Mechanism 9, specified in Clause 6.3
of ISO/IEC 11770-2, [20].  One point at which it significantly diverges from the standard is that the
user’s identity U is never sent in clear text and is known only to the SP and itself (the standard
protocol would require U to be sent in clear text in message M2).
M1.  user → NO:  R S N E U T f R U N TU K U K U US US|| || || [ || || ( || || || )]'+
M2.  NO → SP:  R R S N E U T f R U N TN U K U K U US US|| || || || [ || || ( || || || )]'+
M3.  SP → NO:  e R K T e R K N TK N UN U K U UN UNS US( || || )|| ( || || || )
M4.  NO → user:  T R e R K N T f R R TU N K U UN U K N U UUS UN|| ' || ( || || || )|| ( ' || || )
M5.  user → NO:  f R R NK U NUN ( || ' || )
The protocol procedure is as follows; if at any point a check fails, then the protocol is aborted.
1. The user generates and stores a nonce RU, and generates a new temporary identity, TU.  The user
then sends the NO an authentication request M1, in which it lets the NO know its SP is S.  The
user’s real identity (U) is enciphered using KS+ so that only the SP can read it.
2. In M2 the NO forwards the user’s request to the SP, appending (and storing) a nonce RN.
3. On receipt of M2 the SP deciphers the enciphered string using its private key.  The SP then checks
the output of f using its copy of K'US.  The SP retrieves the temporary identity TU, generates a
session key KUN for use by user and NO, and distributes them in M3.  The SP maintains a database
of relationships between users and temporary identities.
4. On receipt of M3, the NO deciphers (and simultaneously integrity checks) the first part of the
message.  The NO then checks that the nonce it contains is correct, and also uses the nonce to link
the message with the correct ‘transaction’.  The NO then retrieves the new temporary identity TU
and session key KUN, and uses the latter to generate the check-value in message M4 which is a
function of a second nonce, R'N, which the NO also stores.  Note that, when using broadcast
channels, the user’s address must be embedded in any message sent to it.  Thus message M4 is
prefixed with TU, to indicate that, if necessary, TU can be used as the broadcast address for user U
without compromising user U’s anonymity.
5. On receipt of M4, the user deciphers (and integrity checks) the enciphered part.  The user checks
that the nonce it contains is correct, and retrieves the new session key KUN, which is then used to
verify the check-value in the message and to generate message M5.
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6. On receipt of M5, the NO verifies the check-value by recomputing it.
The NO is not given the user’s RI, and can only identify a user by the temporary identity TU supplied
by the SP.  The NO will use the temporary identity TU when communicating with SP in order to be
recompensed for the cost of providing service to the user.
6. Conclusion
The two protocols have the following advantages over the GSM approach mentioned in section 4.1.
1. User RIs are never transmitted in clear text in the mobile radio path (or, for the 2nd mechanism, in
the NO-SP channel).
2. NOs are not given access to a user’s RI.
3. Authentication of both NO and SP is implicitly included.
The protocols can prevent threats T1-T6 in section 4.2.  Threat T7, i.e. that an SP abuses user identity
and location information, can only be prevented by internal management controls imposed by an SP.
A variant of SVO logic, [21], has been used to verify the mechanisms’ correctness; in fact logical
analysis revealed a subtle flaw in a previous version of the first mechanism which has now been
corrected.
The cost of the second mechanism as compared with conventional protocols, for example that
presented in section 5.1, is as follows.  Each SP must have a public key known to its all users and keep
a corresponding private key secret, and each user has to compute E U T f R U N TK U K U US US+ [ || || ( || || || )]' ,
which has then to be checked by the SP.  Note that, for the RSA algorithm, an encryption operation
can be made significantly more efficient than a signature operation, since a relatively small public
exponent can be chosen.  Moreover, transmission of a user-computed signature could also potentially
compromise the confidentiality of a user, if the user’s public verification key is widely known.
Finally note that both protocols rely on the shared key KUS remaining secret long term; other slightly
more complex versions of the mechanisms can be devised which do not have this requirement.  Also,
variants of the 2nd protocol can be devised to deal with various location update requirements,
including a 3-message scheme corresponding to the case of section 5.1.2.
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